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INTRODUCTION 
A principal challenge for Third World countries is the 
development of more efficient processes in the food chain extending 
from the producer through agroindustry to the final consumer. In 
particular, there is an urgent need to create more favorable 
opportunities for small farmers to improve their economic and social 
positions by easing two fundamental constraints: inadequate product 
markets and insufficient production inputs. 
Historically, many institutional arrangements to link the 
different entities in the food chain have developed. A common 
arrangement in less-developed countries is the middleman, a person 
who buys the farmer's product for resale in the wholesale or retail 
markets. Often, to ensure that the farmer delivers the product to 
him, the middleman will provide the grower with cash or in-kind 
credit for production and/or family consumption. This arrangement 
combines marketing and credit, and as such provides the farmer with a 
package of two services. The system has been highly criticized 
because it is alleged that the farmer is placed in a dependent 
position vis-a-vis the middleman and the latter's monopsonistic 
position allows him to take advantage of the farmer. 
Another arrangement, common to export plantation crops, is where 
a food processing or marketing agribusiness firm, sometimes a 
multinational corporation, enters into contractual arrangements with 
farmers to purchase their product in exchange for credit and, 
perhaps, technological assistance. Again, note the farmer receives a 
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package of services that includes at least marketing and credit and 
perhaps more. As with the middleman, the arrangement is criticized 
on dependency and monopsonistic grounds. 
In order to get around these dependent-monopsonic arrangements 
as well as to improve the lot of small farmers, much rural 
development policy has been oriented to developing better product 
markets and providing independent sources of farm inputs, credit and 
technology. Institutional arrangements that have been employed 
include production and marketing cooperatives, development banks and 
credit programs, and agricultural extension services. Most often the 
public sector has been assigned these responsibilities. However, 
more recently, because of growing dissatisfaction with the efficiency 
of public-sector institutions, increased attention has been directed 
to ways that the private sector could be the provider. 
This paper examines a private-sector small-farmer credit 
arrangement in the Dominican Republic--the bridge loan. Under this 
scheme, commercial banks extend credit to agribusiness processing or 
marketing firms in order that they may, in turn, provide production 
credit to farmers who will supply them with raw materials. In 
addition to cash credit, the firm may also provide in-kind inputs, 
and technical assistance. Therefore, the bridge loan is a package 
arrangement that always includes credit and marketing services, but 
may also provide the other components. The government has encouraged 
this activity by making Central Bank refinancing available to the 
commercial banks for bridge loans. Furthermore, the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) is considering making 
more bridge loan refinancing resources available to the Central Bank 
in an initiative to use private-sector banks and business firms as 
ways to provide production credit to small farmers. 
The objectives of our research are: (a) to describe the 
structure of bridge-loan lending, (b) to determine its relative 
importance to the major agribusiness firms, (c) to judge its 
importance to the small farmer in terms of numbers served and 
improving access to credit, (d) to define the credit delivery system 
and measure transactions costs, and (e) to make a judgement about the 
value of the package of services provided compared to traditional 
isolated credit programs. The bridge loan arrangement is nothing 
more than a variation on the above-described, time-worn agribusiness 
financing arrangement. Therefore, in our analysis it is important to 
try to determine if the dependency/monopsony characteristics are 
present and, if so, whether or not they are detrimental to the 
interests of the small farmer. 
Data for the study came from two sources: a census of 
agribusiness firms and a stratified sample survey of small-farmer 
borrowers. Unfortunately, the data from the farmer survey are not 
yet ready for analysis. They will be incorporated in the paper in a 
latter version and are expected to greatly enrich and enhance the 
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analysis. At this point, the paper is confined to an analysis of the 
data obtained in the census of agribusiness firms. 
The paper is organized in three sections. First, the structure 
of bridge loans is described. Second, the Dominican experience is 
examined. Data from the census of agribusiness export firms is 
analyzed to see how firms use bridge loans and the associated package 
of marketing, credit and input_services as-a means to acquire raw · 
materials. The firms relationships with small farmers and credit 
transactions costs are examined. At a later time, when farmer sample 
survey data are available, the views of participating farmers will be 
incorporated into the analysis. Third, tentative conclusions are 
drawn. 
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF BRIDGE LO.ANS 
By definition, a bridge loan is credit extended by a financial 
institution to an agribusiness firm, that markets and/or processes 
agricultural products, in order that the firm can onlend the funds to 
a number of farmers who agree to produce a product that will be sold 
to the firm at harvest. Thus, the firm serves as a "bridge" to carry 
production credit from the financial institution to the farmer 
producer. In this process the two constraints that the small farmer 
may face --markets and inputs-- are simultaneously eased. On the one 
hand the farmer has a guaranteed market for his production. On the 
other hand he has an important input, credit, that can be used to 
acquire productive resources. _In other words, the firm enters into a 
contract with the farmer to provide him with a two-component package-
-market and credit--in exchange for the acquisitions of the product. 
The credit may be provided in cash so that it can be used by the 
farmer to obtain production inputs or to meet family living expenses. 
It may also be made available in the form of in-kind inputs, such as 
fertilizer, machinery services, etc. The firm may elect to provide 
technical assistance to the farmer. To the extent these components 
are added, the package takes on additional dimensions. 
It should be noted that it is not necessary for there to be a 
bridge loan in order for the two constraints to be eased. For this 
to occur, it is sufficient to have the above-described contractual 
arrangement between the firm and the producer; or, for the firm to 
contract with a middleman to provide the firm with raw material, who 
will often get this product through marketing-credit arrangements 
with farmers. The financial institution gets into the act only when 
the firm needs to obtain outside financing to extend credit under 
these contractual arrangements. 
For the bridge loan there are three necessary actors: the 
marketing or processing firm, the farmers who enter into contract 
witn the firm to supply the agricultural products and the financial 
institution. It is possible that there is fourth actor, some type of 
refinancing facility, such as the central bank, to refinance the 
bridge loan credits made by the financial institutions to the firms. 
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The Firm 
The firm is the central decision maker among the actors. It 
must initiate the process, establish contracts with farmers and seek 
the financing. There is a sequence of three interrelated elements. 
The first element is the market. The firm will only enter into 
this arrangement if it believes that it can profitably place its raw 
or processed products in domestic and/or foreign markets. 
The second element is the firm's decision about how it will 
acquire the agricultural product. There are basically four 
alternatives: produce the product itself on owned or rented land, 
purchase the product in the open market or from contracted middlemen, 
undertake production contracts with growers, or a combination of the 
three. 
It is quite probable that the processing or marketing firm would 
prefer a vertical integration structure wherein it would use its own 
land and undertake production directly. However, it is unlikely that 
it would have sufficient land to produce the volume of product that 
the firm needs to operate on a profitable scale. In this case, it 
might decide to enter into contracts to obtain the additional product 
and/or purchase it in- the market. 
Contracts offer the firm several advantages compared to 
purchases in the market. First, under this arrangement the firm can 
plan on an expected supply of product. This may be very important to 
the firm and protect it against shortages. Second, if quality of 
product is important, as it is in many markets, the firm can exert 
quality control. To do this it might provide the grower with 
technical assistance and in-kind credit in the form of inputs to try 
to ensure that the delivered products meets the standards. Third, if 
timing of product delivery is important, as it might be with 
perishable products or for markets that are very season specific, the 
contract mechanism provides a means to control delivery dates by 
carefully planning the production cycle. 
The firm also must incur costs under the contract mechanism. 
There are transactions costs in establishing the contract and in 
visiting the farms during the production cycle, particularly at 
harvest. The bridge loan incurs financial costs, although it is 
possible to recover these through charges to the farmer borrowers. 
Finally, there are the risk costs associated with loans to farmers 
that are not repaid. 
In making its decision as to whether or not use farmer contacts 
and whether or not to use bridge loans, the firm will need to take 
account of all of the above factors and compare the contracting 
arrangement, with or without the bridge loan, with other 
alternatives. 
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The' Farmer 
The farmer's decision as the whether or not to accept a contract 
·will depend on how he views the contractual arrangement vis-a-vis the 
alternatives. From his perspective the contract links the credit 
market and the product market. Although entering the contract may 
reduce his flexibility in either market he may decide it is in his 
favor to accept the contract because his combined net benefits exceed 
those that could gain by operating independently in the credit and 
product markets.1 
The Financial Institution 
The financial institution will decide whether or not to make the 
bridge loan on the basis of usual lending criteria. The overriding 
factor will be the firm's collateral for the loan. This may be a 
problem. Many firms, especially those that are marketers and not 
processors, have a small amount of investment in plant and equipment. 
This limits the amount of collateral that the firm can offer 
directly. The firm could use guarantees of the borrower farmers. 
These possibilities usually are limited, however, because the 
participating farmers have little mortgageable property. The net 
effect is that some firms may encounter relatively low upper limits 
to the size of their bridge loan, a factor that limits the extent of 
their operations. 
THE EXPERIENCE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
This paper examines the use of bridge loans, in 1985, by 
agribusiness firms for three important agricultural products in the 
Dominican Republic: rice, coffee, and melon (cantaloupe). Bridge 
loans are important in the Dominican Republic. Land reform divided 
up the large estates, and has eliminated most of the possibilities 
for vertical integration. Therefore, most production is in the hands 
of relatively small farmers and bridge loans are one means to provide 
these producers with credit. 
Data 
The data utilized in this study come from a 1986 census of those 
agribusiness firms that, in total, accounted for at least 75 percent 
lindeed, there is evidence in the literature that this is the 
case. See: Avishay Braverman and T.N., Srinivasan, "Credit and 
Sharecropping in Agrarian Societies," Journal of Development 
Economics, Vol. 9 (December 1981), pp. 289-312; Avishay Braverman and 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Sharecropping and the Interlinking of Agrarian 
Markets," The American Economic Review, Vol. 72, No. 4 (September 
1982), pp. 695-715; and Pradiep K. Mitra, "A Theory of Interlinked 
Rural Transactions," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 20 (1983), pp. 
167-91. 
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of the domestic or export sales of each of the nine important 
Dominican agricultural products. The reported data are for the 
calendar year 1985. Because of space limitations, this paper is 
confined to presenting abbreviated results of the analysis for firms 
involved in three representative products: rice, a traditional 
product produced for the domestic market; coffee, a traditional 
product produced for export; and melon~ a new _product produced for 
export sale in the U.S. winter market. In the census, there were 8 
rice mills, 9 coffee exporters and a single exporter melon. 
Sources of Primary Material for Agribusiness Firms 
As shown in Table 1, agribusiness financing of farmer production 
was the most important means for the firms to obtain their primary 
material for the three products. In the case of the melon exporter, 
it was the only mea~s. Purchases from intermediaries were also 
important for half of the rice millers and one-third of the coffee 
exporters. Only one-fourth of the rice firms ranked their own 
production as an important source, but two-thirds of the coffee firms 
considered it important. 
Agribusiness Financing of Farmers 
All firms provided financing to farmers. Their sources of 
funding are shown in Table 2. Most rice mills and coffee exporters 
used both their own funds and bridge loans. For the melon exporter, 
the only source was bridge loans. Bridge loan credits were obtained 
from private-sector commercial banks. Bridge loans are not a new 
phenomenon. Some 86 percent of the rice mills have used them for 
more than 10 years; for coffee exporters the figure was 57 percent; 
and the melon firm used them since it was established in 1981. 
The data of Table 3 more clearly show the importance of the 
firms financing farmers. There were 1,000, 3,994 and 3,797 farmers 
with credit supplied by the melon, rice and coffee enterprises, 
respectively. For melon exporters, rice mills and coffee exporters, 
100, 92, and 82 percent of the firms' purchases came from farmers who 
were financed. 
The size of the firms within each product varied considerably. 
Four of the eight rice mills financed 100 or less farmers, but one 
mill financed 3,000 farmers. Likewise, four of the nine coffee firms 
financed 100 or fewer farmers, but one exporter lent to 835 farmers. 
The melon firm extended credit to 1,000 farmers. 
Firms.rated the importance of factors that encouraged them to 
finance farmers. All firms, save one rice mill, ranked financing as 
2The other products are cocoa,· milk, peanuts, sugar cane, 
tobacco and tomatoes. Data and analyses for all nine products will 
be presented in a forthcoming report. 
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very important ·or important to ensure a supply of primary materials. 
A large majority considered it a very important or important means of 
quality control. The melon exporter ranked financing as an important 
means to gain access to land and labor. These two factors were much 
less important for the coffee exporters and rice mills. 
Most firms also financed some farmers indirectly through 
intermediaries. As shown in Table 4, the melon exporter did not 
purchase from intermediaries. However, some 62.5 and 33.7 percent of 
the rice mills and coffee exporters purchase primary materials from a 
number of intermediaries. Some of these firms, particularly the rice 
mills, have followed this practice for many years. 
All of the firms that purchased primary materials from 
intermediaries extended financing to them. Both bank loans and the 
firms' own resources were important sources of funds for this credit. 
Typically, the firms gave intermediaries bulk cash advances against 
expected sales of the product. All coffee firms opined that the 
intermediaries used these funds to provide farmers with cash advances 
against the harvest. Two-thirds thought that they also provided in-
kind food and household goods, and one-third said they provided farm 
inputs. In contrast, the rice mills reported that their 
intermediaries used the borrowed funds to provide farmers with not 
only cash advances and in-kind food and household products, but also 
three-fourths of them provided in-kind farm inputs. 
Description of Financed Farmers 
Farmers directly financed by firms mostly had relatively small-
sized farms. This was particularly true for melons. As shown in 
Table 5, melon growers had average-sized farms of 25 tareas or less 
(there are 6 tareas per acre). They were exclusively land reform 
beneficiaries in Azua province. Except for one firm, rice growers 
were mostly small or medium-sized farmers located in the rich 
flatlands of the Cibao Valley. The several rice mills reported a 
wide range of average size farms. Coffee exporters dealt mostly with 
small and medium-sized growers that were located in the mountainous 
areas of the provinces of Azua, Barahora, Bani, La Vega, Mocha and 
Santiago. Relatively few rice or coffee growers were land reform 
beneficiar~es, only 19.2 and 12.8 percent respectively; most were 
landowners, only a handful were renters. 
Conditions and Terms of Credit 
The firms provided operations credit, the term of which was 
pegged to the length of the crop cycle; 3-6 months for rice and 
melons and 7-12 months for coffee. The firms intended the credit to 
be used mostly for production purposes, but all firms included funds 
for family living expenses ~nd/or family labor. Most firms made 
multiple loan disbursements that coincided with different stages of 
the production cycle. The several rice mills reported from 3 to 20 
disbursements, coffee firms 1 to 20 and the melon exporter 15. 
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Disbursements were mostly made by check or cash. Only a few rice and 
coffee firms and the melon enterprise also disbursed in kind. 
The firms reported that loan size was determined by number of 
tareas cultivated, production costs and previous credit experience. 
The average amount lent by the firms per tarea were $RD350, $RD124 
and $RD52, for melon, rice and coffee, respectively. The different 
amounts reflect both capital intensity of production and percent of 
production costs financed. The melon firm financed 100 percent of 
production costs, whereas the different rice and coffee enterprises 
financed from 25-100 percent and 10-100 percent of these costs, 
respectively. Rice mills and especially coffee firms were disposed 
to provide borrowers credit for special needs such as health 
emergencies, weddings and funerals. 
There was considerable variation among firms with respect to 
their average interest rates. The melon exporter did not charge 
interest, annual rates for rice mills ranged from 12 to 30 percent, 
and coffee firms were either 12 or 24 percent. 
All firms except the melon enterprise and four coffee exporters 
required one or more forms of collateral. Most common was the pledge 
of the harvest although about half of the rice and coffee firms used 
land titles. Three-fourths of the rice firms required cosigners. 
Extensive technical assistance was always provided by the melon 
firm. In contrast, only 44 percent and 11 percent of the coffee and 
rice enterprises provided it along with credit. 
Most firms expected the borrowers to sell them all of their 
production of the financed crop. The percentages were 100, 87.5 and 
55.6 for melon, rice and coffee firms, respectively. 
Credit Delivery Procedures 
The procedures for credit delivery to borrowers from all of the 
firms appeared to be straight forward and simple. Loan applications 
were approved rapidly, in one week or less, except for two coffee and 
one rice firms. All enterprises required borrowers to sign a written 
loan contract, which was done in the office. The first disbursement 
was usually made at this time. Successive disbursements were also 
made at the office. An exception was the melon firm, which made all 
disbursements, often in-kind, at the farm site. With each 
disbursement, most firms asked borrowers to sign an IOU. 
At harvest, the rice mills picked up the product at the farm 
site but all melon growers and most coffee growers were expected to 
deliver the product at the office. All rice and melon firms and two-
thirds of the coffee firms furnish the transportation. Except for 
rice, the farmer usually is charged for this service. 
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All firms, except 3 coffee enterprises, canceled the farmers' 
credit when they delivered the harvested product to the firm; the 
amount owed was discounted from the value of the product. The 
difference typically was paid to the farmer by check or in cash, 
usually within a period of a week. 
Marketing Aspects 
Agribusiness credits to farmers are often criticized because the 
monopsonistic position of the enterprises could permit them to pay 
the farmer lower prices directly or, indirectly, by underweighing the 
product when it is sold. None of the firms reported, however, that 
they paid lower than market-level prices. Three-fourths of the rice 
mills and two-thirds of the coffee exporters indicated that they paid 
the farmers current market prices. The other one-third of the coffee 
firms said they paid higher prices. The melon firm and two rice 
mills reported that they paid the farmers a previously contracted 
price. 
One-half of the rice mills and two-thirds of the coffee firms 
indicated that they would discount product prices. Impurities and 
excessive humidity were the most important reasons. The melon firm 
did not discount prices because it paid the contracted price. The 
incidence and magnitudes of the discounts appeared to be relatively 
low. In a normal crop year, the rice mills and coffee firms reported 
that the average percentage of farmers subjected to discounts was 
18.7 and 33.3 percent, respectively. The average size of the 
discounts ranged from 2.7 to 11.3 percent and 5.3 to 17.5 percent for 
the two products, respectively. 
The firms unanimously reported that the farmer was present at 
the time his product was weighed by the enterprise. This does not 
eliminate the possibilities of underweighing, but it does impose 
limits to the use of this practice by the firms. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Bridge loans from commercial banks, channeled to farmers through 
agribusiness firms were the most important means that Dominican rice 
millers, coffee exporters and a melon exporter employed to procure 
the primary materials for their firms. Under this system, farmers 
who received credit were expected to reciprocate by selling their 
harvest to the agribusiness enterprises. This arrangement was not 
new, most firms had practiced it for many years. 
On a much smaller scale, the agribusinesses indirectly financed 
farm production by means of loans to marketing intermediaries. These 
middlemen would onlend the funds they received from the firms to 
farmers who agreed to sell them their harvest. Then the 
intermediaries would resell the product to the firm. In addition, 
some firms produced limited amounts of primary material on their own 
farms. 
10 
The long-established practice of bridge-loan credit, as well as 
its overwhelmingly relative importance to the firms as a supply of 
primary materials, attest to the viability of the system for the 
firms. Additional testimony is that the firms unanimously stated 
that they wanted to continue with bridge loans. Furthermore, most 
agribusiness enterprises considered the reciprocal linkages between 
farms and firms, that were forged by credit, were very important 
means to ensure reliable supplies of quality products. 
The linkages made possible by credit provided the firms with a 
structure of quasi vertical integration, because, under the credit 
arrangement, the agribusinesses could obtain some degree of control 
over farm production. Moreover, the intermediary marketing function 
was absorbed by the firm. The degree of vertical integration was 
most pronounced in the melon enterprise. This firm tightly 
controlled farm production and marketing. Little was left to chance. 
Technicians gave directions to farmers as to when and how each stage 
of the production process was to be undertaken. In-kind agricultural 
chemicals and machinery services were delivered to the farm site. 
Product prices were predetermined by contractual agreement. In 
effect, the farmer was providing his land and family labor to the 
firm but the enterprise managed the production. The nature of the 
melon export market explains why this firm chose to exercise so much 
control, compared to enterprises involved with coffee and rice. 
Melons are very perishable and the time window for their sale in the 
U.S. winter market is narrow. Moreover, the product exported must be 
of a uniformly high quality. In contrast, rice and coffee are 
considerably less perishable and market quality standards are not so 
rigid. Thus, the firms involved in these products do not need to 
practice such extensive control. Consequently, for these two 
products, there was less technical assistance and fewer in-kind 
inputs. Because close control was not necessary, some of the rice 
and coffee firms extended credit to widely-dispersed clients whose 
farms were up to 100 kilometers from the firms' offices, whereas all 
of the 1,000 melon growers were concentrated within a 2 kilometer 
radius of the firm's facilities. 
The firms reported that they believed the farmers were satisfied 
with the system.3 They indicated that with the bridge-loan credit, 
farmers should have had better access to credit, been able to use 
better technology, and raise family incomes. It would also appear 
that seasonal cash flow problems were alleviated. The simple credit 
delivery system suggests that the farmers obtained credit opportunely 
and borrower transactions costs were low. Loan interest rates were 
3rn a second stage of the research project, in May and June 1987 
a stratified sample survey of 525 farmers who received bridge-loan 
credit from the census used agribusiness firms were interviewed. 
When the data from this survey are available there will be· additional 
and more concrete information on farmer experiences with and 
attitudes about bridge loan credit. 
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not found to be high relative to bank rates. Of course, the 
monopsonistic relationship opened the door to the possibilities of 
the firm gaining advantage by offering lower prices, discounting 
prices on the basis of below-standard quality, or underweighing the 
product. The firms, however, did not appear to take excessive 
advantage of farmers in these ways. One reason may be that the firms 
are looking to a long-term relationship with their farmer clients. 
By the same token, the farmers may have been willing to tolerate 
a few irregularities with the prices in order to maintain the 
collective benefits of the-"production-marketing package" that the 
firm offers. The package includes a predictable line of production 
and/or family consumption credit with low transactions costs 
(including good prospects for loans for emergency needs such as 
sickness, funerals, etc.), a sure market outlet, and, perhaps, some 
technical assistance. In other words, the credit, product and 
technical services were interlinked and the rational farmer made his 
decision on credit use based on the total expected net benefits 
obtained from the package. He probably calculated that the sum of 
these benefits were higher than he could expect to gain by operating 
independently in the separate markets. An indicator of the success 
of the system is that 69.7 percent of the total firms reported an 
annual turnover of clients of less than 4 percent and another 18.2 
percent showed a turnover of 5 to 10 percent. 
Bridge loans appear to provide a structure for efficient and 
effective credit delivery. Commercial banks, and even the state 
Agricultural Bank, would not be willing to extend individual credits 
credit to many of the farmers served by bridge loans. Small bank 
loans are costly to make and administer, and risk is high because 
farmers often do not have adequate collateral. In contrast, with 
bridge loans, the bank makes one large loan and has the collateral 
pledged by the agribusiness enterprise to guard against risk. 
Moreover, because the firm protects its interests, it will try to 
ensure that the credit arrives to the farmer opportunely. 
With these advantages, what have we learned through the study of 
the three products that sheds light on perspectives for expanding 
bridge loans in the Dominican Republic? Bridge-loans offer 
advantages for financing many more.farmers than would be reached by a 
system of individual loans. The fact that these loans have been 
prevalent for many years, suggests that the current markets for 
credit to finance these products are in equilibrium. Therefore, 
future growth of bridge loans will be determined by domestic and 
foreign factors that shape the size of market for Dominican rice, 
coffee and melon products. There is room for optimism because the 
demand for rice will increase with domestic economic growth and there 
are favorable perspectives for diversifying and expanding 
agricultural exports, especially tropical fruits and vegetables. The 
firm's own projections are good indicators of the future; most 
expected their bridge loan credit operations to expand. 
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Table 1 - Importance of Sources of Firms' Primary Materials 
Rice Mills Coffee ExEorters Melon ExEorters 
Number % Number % Number % 
Farmers with 
financing from firm 
Very important 5 62.S 8 88.9 1 100.0 
Important 1 12.5 0 0.0 0 o.o 
Not important 2 25.0 1 11.1 
_Q. o.o 
8 100.0 9 100.0 l. 100.0 
Purchases from 
intermediaries 
Very important 2 25.0 3 33.3 0 0.0 
Important 2 25.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Not important 4 so.a 6 66.7 1 100.0 
8 100.0 9 100.0 1 100.0 
Firm's own production 
Very important 0 0.0 5 55.6 0 0.0 
Important 2 25.0 1 11.1 0 0.0 
Not important 6 75.0 3 33.3 1 100.0 
8 100.0 9 100.0 1 100.0 
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Table 2 - Incidence of Firms Financing Farmers and Use of 
Bridge Loans, 1985 
Rice Mills Coffee ExEorters Melon ExEorters 
Number ~ Number ~ Number 7. 
Number of firms 8 100.0 9 100.0 1 100.0 
Number of 
firms extending 8 100.0 9 100.0 1 100.0 
financing to 
farmers 
Sources of funds 
Firm's own funds 6 75.0 7 77.8 0 0.0 
Bridge loans 1 87.5 7 77.8 1 100.0 
Years firms have been using 
bridge loans Number 7. Number 7. Number 7. 
1-2 0 o.o 1 14.3 0 0.0 
3-5 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 100.0 
6-10 1 14.3 2 28.6 0 0.0 
11-20 3 42.9 3 42.9 0 . 0. 0 
More than 20 3 42.9 1 14.3 0 0.0 
Total 7 100.0 7 100.0 1 100.0 
Range age of firms 
Youngest 12 2 4 
Oldest 76 38 4 
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Table 3 - Importance of Firm Financing of Farmers as 
Source of Primary Materials to Firms 
Rice Mills 
Number of firms 8 
Total number of 
financed farmers 3,994 
Percent financed 
farmers of total 
farmers selling to 
firms 92. 0 
Coffee Exporters 
9 
3,797 
82.0 
Importance of reasons why firm offers financing 
Ensure supply of 
primary materials 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
Access to.land for 
production 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
Access to labor 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
Product quality 
control 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
Number % Number 
6 
1 
1 
8 
2 
1 
5 
8 
1 
3 
4 
8 
4 
0 
4 
8 
75.0 
12.5 
12.5 
100.0 
25.0 
12.5 
62.5 
100.0 
12.5 
37.5 
50.0 
100.0 
50.0 
0.0 
50.0 
100.0 
5 
4 
0 
9 
2 
3 
4 
9 
3 
2 
4 
g 
6 
2 
1 
9 
55.6 
44.4 
0.0 
100.0 
22.2 
33.3 
44.4 
100.0 
33.3 
22.2 
44.4 
100.0 
67.7 
22.2 
11.1 
100.0 
Melon Exporters 
1 
1,000 
100.0 
Number % 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
100.0 
0.0 
0.0 
100.0 
100.0 
0.0 
0.0 
100.0 
0.0 
100.0 
0.0 
100.0 
100.0 
0.0 
0.0 
100.0 
• • 
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Table 4 - Importance of Intermediaries to Firms 
as Source of Raw Materials 
Rice Mills Coffee ExEorters Melon ExEorters 
Number % Number % Number % 
Number of firms 
that buy from 
intermediaries 5 62.5 3 33.3 0 0.0 
Number of firms 
that extend 
financing to 
intermediaries 5 100.0 3 100.0 0 0.0 
Average number of 
intermediaries 
per firm 8.7 20.3 0 0.0 
Years firms have been 
buying from 
intermediaries Number % Number ,., lo Number % 
1-2 0 0.0 1 33.3 0 0.0 
3-5 0 0.0 1 33.3 0 0.0 
6-10 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
11-20 2 40.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
More than 20 3 60.0 1 33.3 0 0.0 
5 100.0 3 100.0 0 0.0 
Firm's sources of 
financing to 
extend credit to 
intermediaries Number % Number 7. Number % 
Firm's own funds 5 100.0 2 67.7 0 0.0 
Bank loans 4 80.0 3 100.0 0 0.0 
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Table 5 - Characteristics of Farmers Receiving 
Financing From Firms 
Total Tareas financed 
Distribution of average 
farm size (Tareas) 
Rice Mills 
2s6,soo 
Number % 
0-25 
26-100 
101-200 
201-500 
More than 500 
Percent of financed 
farmers in reform 
1 
3 
2 
0 
1 
7 
sector (unweighted) 19.2 
14.3 
42.9 
28.6 
0.0 
14.3 
100.0 
Coffee Exporters Melon Exporters 
56,515 17,000 
Number % Number % 
0 0.0 1 100.0 
7 87.8 0 0.0 
1 11.1 0 0.0 
1 11.1 0 0.0 
0 0.0 0 0.0 
9 100.0 1 100.0 
12.8 100.0 
• 
